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Recent Cases
CIVIL PROCEDURE-TOLLING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BY
COMMENCEMENT OF CIVIL ACTION IN MISSOURI
Continental Electric Co. v. Ebco, I nc.'
Continental Electric Company furnished materials to contractor Ebco for
a job at the Ford Motor Company plant. The materials were never paid for
and Continental filed an action to enforce a materialman's lien. The petition
was filed within the six-month statutory period2 and named both contractor
Ebco and owner Ford as defendants.$ Process was issued and served on Ford,
but returned "non est" on Ebco. Eight months after the "non est" return Continental requested an alias summons and it was served on Ebco's registered agent.
Ebco defaulted and the jury returned a verdict for Continental establishing
a lien against Ford's property. The trial court sustained Ford's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because of Continental's failure to join Ebco, a
necessary party, before the statute of limitations had run. The Kansas City Court
of Appeals reversed and ordered judgment entered in accordance with the verdict.
Ford moved to have the cause transferred to the supreme court on the ground
that the decision of the court of appeals conflicted with controlling decisions of
the supreme court. The motion was granted and the supreme court affirmed the
trial court's judgment for Ford, holding that Continental's failure to cause issuance of the alias summons within a reasonable time after the "non est" return
constituted a discontinuance of the suit against Ebco, and the statute of limitations which ran in the meantime barred further action.
Continental contended that it had complied with the Missouri rules and had
done nothing to obstruct service on Ebco.4 The Missouri rules provide that once
the petition has been filed and process issued the action is commenced. 5 Since
issuance of process is automatic and out of plaintiff's control, the action is actually
commenced insofar as the plaintiff's responsibility extends when the petition is
filed.6 The Kansas City Court of Appeals accepted this reasoning when it cited

1963).

1. 375 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. 1964), reversing 365 S.W.2d 746 (K.C. Mo. App.

2. § 429.170, RSMo 1959.
3. § 429.190, RSMo 1959.
4. Supra note 1, 375 S.W.2d at 136.
5. § 506.110-2, RSMo 1959: "The filing of a petition ... and suing out of
process therein shall be taken and deemed the commencement of a suit.!
6. § 506.120, RSMo 1959: "Upon the filing of the petition, the clerk shall
forthwith issue the required summons or other process, and . . . deliver it for
service to the sheriff or to a person specially appointed to serve it. Upon request
(145)
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City of St. Louis v. Millerf as stating the proper rule." The Miller case held that
a suit is commenced for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations "when the
petition is filed, even though process is not thereafter issued until the period of
limitation has run."9
The court in Richards Brick Co. v. Wright.0 adopted the same rule but noted
an exception where plaintiff prevented issuance of process. The Missouri Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Great Lakes Steel Corp. v. Sartorius- construed the Missouri
rule similar to the federal rule when it stated: "A suit is commenced when the
petition is filed."'' 2 The theory underlying all these decisions is that the issuance of
summons is the clerk's responsibility and so long as plaintiff does not obstruct
issuance he has done all the law requires for commencement of an action.13
This reasoning is valid where the summons is to be issued automatically
without further action by plaintiff. The present case can be distinguished, however, because the first summons was returned "non est" and issuance of the
alias summons was not automatic. Because of this distinction the rule adopted by
the Kansas City Court of Appeals was not broad enough to cover the problem
in the present case.
The problem, is twofold: (1) When is an action commenced for the purpose
of tolling the statute of limitations, and (2) What must a plaintiff do to prevent a
properly instituted action from being discontinued? The court of appeals in the instant case apparently considered only the first question in holding that once the
action was commenced the statute of limitations was permanently tolled.
The supreme court in the present case put the greater weight on the second
question: What is necessary to prevent a properly commenced suit from being
discontinued? A number of answers, none entirely satisfactory, are given in the
cases cited in the court's opinion. The court in St. FerdinandSewer Dist. v. Tur-

of the plaintiff, separate or additional summons shall issue against any defendants,
including alias and pluries summons."
7. 235 Mo. App. 987, 145 S.W.2d 504 (St. L. Ct. App. 1940).
8. Continental Electric Co. v. Ebco, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 746, 749 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1963), rev'd 375 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. 1964).
9. Supra note 7, at 990, 145 S.W.2d at 505; e.g., Bair v. Producers Gravel
Co., 341 Mo. 1106, 1109, 111 S.W.2d 521, 523 (1937); South Missouri Lumber
Co. v. Wright, 114 Mo. 326, 332, 21 S.W. 811, 812 (1893); Gosline v. Thompson,
61 Mo. 471 (1875).
10. 231 Mo. App. 946, 956, 82 S.W.2d 274, 280 (St. L. Ct. App. 1935): "As
in the case of actions generally, a suit or action to enforce a mechanic's lien is
deemed to have been commenced when the petition is filed, unless the issuance
of summons in regular course is ordered withheld at the direction of the plaintiff;
. . . and this is so even though summons is not actually issued by the clerk until
after the ... period of limitation has meanwhile expired."
11. 249 S.W.2d. 853 (Mo. En Banc 1952).
12. Id. at 855; FED. R. Civ. P. 3: "A civil action is commenced by filing a
complaint with the court."
13. See e.g., State ex rel. Evans v. Broaddus, 245 Mo. 123, 137, 149 S.W. 473,
476 (En Banc 1912), motion to quash writ of habeas corpus; Hill-Behan Lumber
Co. v. Sellers, 149 S.W.2d 465, 467 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941), delay of service
in mechanic's lien action by order of plaintiff's attorney. City of St. Louis v. Miller,
supra note 7, action by scire facias for revival of judgment; Richards Brick Co. v.
Wright, supra note 10, priority between conflicting mechanic's liens.
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ner" came close to a concise rule when it held that commencement of a suit was
only a conditional halting of the statute, the condition being plaintiff's prosecution
of the suit with diligence and good faith. If this condition isn't met the statute
begins running again as if never tolled.15
This rule isn't entirely satisfactory as it leaves open the question of what
constitutes "diligence and good faith." The Missouri Supreme Court in Drscoll
v. Konze-6 decided that no general rule could be formulated, the circumstances in
each case being determinative of what is reasonable. This places the burden on
the plaintiff to decide what is reasonable conduct, and the penalty for mistake is
discontinuance of his suit.
In other jurisdictions actions are generally commenced in one of three different ways: filing petition ("federal type" rules); filing petition and issuance of
summons ("Missouri type" rules); or actual service.17 In practice the "federal type"
and "Missouri type" rules usually operate similarly because the courts often require either issuance of process or diligence in obtaining issuance under "federal
type" rules2s Kansas has a rule similar to Missouri's but prescribes what is reasonable conduct with a statute requiring actual service within sixty days of commencement by filing a petition and issuance of summons.19 While this approach
lacks the flexibility of the "federal type" rule, the definite cut-off time does remove
all doubt about reasonable time. The actual service rules are the most definite, but
may work hardships because of the difficulty in anticipating time required for actual
service.
The present interpretation of the Missouri rule leads to these results:
1. The suit is commenced by filing of the petition since the issuance of process
is automatic and not dependent on action by plaintiff.
2. If for any reason process is returned unserved, it becomes plaintiff's duty to
exercise reasonable diligence to insure issuance of alias or further process.
3. The alias or further process must be issued within a reasonable time or a
properly commenced suit will be discontinued. What is a reasonable time is
determined by the facts of the particular case.
14. 208 S.W.2d 85, 87 (St. L. Mo. App. 1948).
15. Mayne v. Jacob Michel Real Estate Co., 237 Mo. App. 952, 955, 180
S.W.2d 809, 810 (St. L. Ct. App. 1944): "The question . . . is as to whether
or not there was such a delay in the issuance of other process . . . as to interrupt

the continuity of the suit so that the running of the statute became a bar to the
suit." The time between the filing of the petition and discontinuance of the suit
is included in the statutory period when the statute begins running again. The
statutory time limit will not be extended by plaintiff's negligence.
16. 322 S.W.2d 824, 829 (Mo. 1959).
17. See Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 236 (1953).
18. See e.g., Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153, 154 (6th Cir. 1956); Boomar v.
Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947); Isaacks
v. Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26, 28 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 781 (1944);
Huffmaster v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 120, 122 (N.D. Cal. 1960); Rotwein,
Pleading and Practice Under the New Federal Rdes-A Survey and Comparison,

8

L. REV. 188, 193 (1938).
19. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-301, -308 (1949), construed in Mingenback
v. Mingenback, 176 Kan. 471, 481, 271 P.2d 782, 789 (1954).
BROOKLYN
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The underlying policy is that the action is commenced and continued so long as
plaintiff has no further duties. If further action is required by plaintiff to give the
court jurisdiction over the other party, he must act reasonably or his suit will
be discontinued.
THOMAS J. ENis

CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
APPLYING FORUM LAW
Clay v. Sun Inurance Offlce, Ltd.'

In April of 1952, John Clay insured personal property with Sun Insurance
Office. At the time Clay was living in Illinois, where the property was located and
where Sun Insurance, a British corporation, was licensed to do business. The contract was executed in Illinois.
One of the provisions of the policy was a clause which barred any action on
the policy unless suit was brought one year after the loss. Although the Illinois
statute of limitations was longer than the 12-month period specified in the
policy, under Illinois law such a contractual limitation was valid.
In July of 1952, Clay moved to Florida, a state in which Sun Insurance was
licensed to do business, taking with him the insured property. In December
of 1954, and January of 1955, the insured property was destroyed in Florida.
Clay reported the loss to Sun in February of 1955, but he did not bring this
action to recover on the policy until May of 1957.
When Clay brought suit in a federal district court in Florida, Sun Insurance
relied on the 12-month clause of the policy as a defense. Clay countered this defense with section 95.03 of the Florida Statutes (1957) which declared the 12month clause unenforceable and void as an attempt to shorten the five-year period
allowed by the applicable Florida statute of limitations3
The trial court judgment for Clay was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals.' That court held that the application of section 95.03 to this contract, executed in a state where such a provision limiting the period for bringing
suit was valid, violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment:
Assuming that a state might, if its connections with a foreign con-

tract are sufficiently great, be permitted to effectuate its own public
policy by striking down an agreement which was valid where made, the
question remains: are the contacts which Florida has with this contract
great enough to permit this to be done in this case? These contacts consist of nothing more than the presence of the insured property and the
beneficiary in the state of Florida beginning subsequent to the formation
of the contract and continuing up to the time of the suit. .
1.
2.
3.
4.

.

. Under

377 U.S. 179 (1964).
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 208 (1960).
Id. at 209, n.2.
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
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strikingly similar circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that the
forum state did not have the right to deprive a defendant of a contractual
provision limiting the time within which suit could be brought. [citing
Hartford Accident & Indenity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S.
143 (1934)J5
Clay appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the judgment of the
Fifth Circuit was overruled. Speaking for the majority, Justice Frankfurter declared that the Court of Appeals had erred in deciding the constitutional question before it decided the two non-constitutional questions raised by this case:
(1) Were the losses for which Clay sought recovery within the "all risks" coverage
of the policy; and (2) Would a Florida state court apply section 95.03 to this
policy?
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black held that the constitutional issue
should be decided at that time, and expressed the view that application of section
95.03 to the insurance policy clause would violate no constitutional provision.
Attacking the Fifth Circuit's use of Delta & Pine as precedent, Black said:
The only philosophy on which the Dick and Delta & Pine Land Co.
cases could be made to apply here would be on the old idea that the law
of the place where the contract is made always governs every activity
under it, a rule that had been repudiated by courts and commentators
everywhere, especially as a constitutional rule.7
And in a footnote, he added:
Constitutionally requiring blind and unvarying application of the
internal law of the place of making is a return to the outmoded territorial
and vested rights theories of conflict of laws long ago outgrown by our
jurisprudences
Both non-constitutional questions were certified to the Supreme Court of
Florida and both were answered by that court in the affirmative.9
When the case went before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals a second
time, that court again reversed trial court judgment for Clay, holding that the
presence or absence of "significant contacts" was the criterion for deciding the
issue of whether 14th Amendment due process had been denied.10 Once again, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that Delta & Pine was controlling and that due process had
been denied Sun Insurance when section 95.03 was applied to cut off its defense
under the 12-month clause of the policy.
The court said: "The local contacts of Florida, in the case before us, are
certainly no more, and in our view are less, than in the Delta & Pine case.""1
Clay again appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and in 1964 the
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 526.
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., supra note 2.
363 U.S. at 220.
363 U.S. at 220-21, n.15.
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505 at 511 (5th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 512.
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final opinion of the final court of this nation resolved, the case in favor of Clay,
overruling the Fifth Circuit a second time."1 Between the time that the Supreme
Court heard the case the first time and the date of its second ruling on Clay's
suit, Justice Frankfurter -had retired.' 8 Justice Douglas, not Black, wrote the
Court's opinion in 1964.
In his terse opinion, Douglas made short work of the Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit issues raised by the parties:
We see no difficulty whatever under either the Full Faith and Credit
Clause or the Due Process Clause. 14
... Florida has ample contacts with the present transaction to satisfy any
conceivable requirements of due process.1 5
Douglas made reference to two previous cases which turned on the Full
Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses, summarizing what was held but
without announcing any general principle to be derived from them. Those cases
are Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.'-,-a case involving conflicting
state laws as they applied to a policy issued by a commercial insurance companyand Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. IndustrialAccident Commision'-a workmen's compensation case.
Three other cases were distinguished: Hartford Accident & Indemnity v.
Delta & Pine Land Co.,' s and Home Insurance Co. v. Dick' 9-both cases involving
policies issued by commercial insurance companies-and Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe °0-involving a policy issued by a fraternal
benefit society.
Of the Delta & Pine and Dick cases, Douglas said:
Those were cases where the activities in the State of the forum were
thought to be too slight and too casual, as in the Delta & Pine Land Co.
case, . . . , to make the application of local law consistent with due
lacking, as in the Dick case. No deficiency of that order
process, or wholly
2
is present here. 1
The Wolfe case was waived aside as a "highly specialized decision dealing with
unique facts-a suit on an insurance policy issued by an Ohio fraternal society. ... 22

Douglas quoted from the Black dissent, but selected that part of the
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., supra note 1.
August 28, 1962.
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., supra note 1, at 181.
Id. at 183.
348 U.S. 66 (1954).
306 U.S. 493 (1939).
292 U.S. 143 (1934).
281 U.S. 586 (1930).
331 U.S. 586 (1947).
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., supra note 1, at 181-182.
Id. at 183.
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dissent which stressed that Sun Insurance reasonably could have expected to be
sued in Florida because the policy provisions purported to cover the property
wherever it was located and because Sun Insurance was licensed to do business in
Florida.
After seven years of litigation, one might expect that this case would clarify
the existing body of precedent dealing with the effect of the Full Faith and Credit
and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution in the area of conflict of laws. But
this was not done.
The Fifth Circuit was on solid ground when it noticed a striking similarity
between Clay and Delta & Pine. In the latter case, a surety bond on the employees
of the Delta & Pine Land Co. was executed and delivered in Tennessee by Hartford Accident & Indemnity. Both Delta & Pine, a Mississippi corporation, and
Hartford Accident & Indemnity, a Connecticut corporation, were licensed to do
business in Tennessee. Like the policy in the Clay case, the surety bond contained a provision requiring any suit on the bond to be commenced within a
shorter period than the applicable Tennessee statute of limitations. Such a provision was enforceable in Tennessee. The bond purported to cover any employee,
anywhere.
Through the dishonesty of one of the bonded employees, Delta & Pine suffered
a loss. The dishonest acts and the resulting loss took place in Mississippi where
Hartford Accident & Indemnity was licensed to do business. Like Florida, Mississippi had a statute which invalidated any attempt by parties to an insurance
policy to contract for a shorter period of limitations than the one set by the
Mississippi statute. In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
that Mississippi could not apply its statute to the surety bond which had been
executed in Tennessee because the "relative importance of the interests of the
forum as contrasted with those created at the place of the contract" were so
slight as to make application of Mississippi law a denial of due process guaranteed
by the 14th Amendment.23 The Court gave no consideration to the Full Faith
and Credit requirements in that case.
The facts and ultimate holding in the Clay case considerably weaken Delta
Pine as precedent, 'but the Douglas opinion does not overrule Delta & Pine,
it simply distinguishes that case.
The abbreviated treatment which the Douglas opinion gives to the Full Faith
and Credit and 14th Amendment Due Process Clauses is less than illuminating
on the question of the effect these two constitutional provisions will have when
they are brought to bear on a choice-of-law question, especially after comparing
Clay with Delta & Pine. Further, the opinion gives no indication of how the Court
applied these provisions to reach its final result in Clay.
Before the Clay case made its first trip to the Fifth Circuit, Brainerd Currie
had announced his analysis of how the Supreme Court applied the Full Faith

23. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., supra note
18, at 150.
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and Credit and 14th Amendment Due Process Clauses to choice of law questions
in these terms:
[A] state court's choice of law will be upset under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause only when the state whose law
is applied has no legitimate interest in its application.24
Currie thought that the case law supported his thesis, although he admitted
that most commentators assumed that in cases where two states had a "legitimate
interest" in the application of their own law, the Supreme Court would "weigh" the
25
respective interests to uphold or strike down the forum court's choice of law.
Currie's hope and thesis was that in a case where two states each had a legitimate
interest in the action, the Supreme Court would affirm the forum court's choice of
its own law without weighing the respective state interests.
From the facts recited in Clay, it would appear that Florida had a legitimate
interest in protecting its citizens against improvident contract stipulations which
purport to limit the time for bringing an action to less than the period allowed by
the statute of limitations. Both parties and the property were in Florida at the
time the loss occurred. But it would seem equally true that Illinois has a legitimate
interest in attracting insurance companies by allowing them to make advantageous
(although not unconscionable) contracts. Both parties and the property were in
Illinois when the contract was executed.
The final Clay decision is perfectly consistent with an application of the Currie
thesis to the facts of the case. Although the Currie thesis is not stated expressly
in the text of the opinion as the basis for the decision, neither are the terms "weigh"
or "balance" employed to compare the interests of Florida with those of Illinois.
Cited favorably in the Douglas opinion were both Watson and Pacific Employers, cases which Currie relies on as supporting his theory. 20 However, these
cases do contain language which is subject to the interpretation that in the situation where two states have legitimate interests in the application of their own laws
to a case, the Supreme Court does weigh the competing interests and makes its
choice of law in favor of the state whose interests are heavier in order to satisfy
the constitutional requirements of Full Faith and Credit and Due Process.27
24. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, 26 U. OF CHx. L. REv. 9, 75 (1958).
25. Id. at 76.
26. Id. at 48 (Watson) and 22 (Pacific Employers).
27. In the Watson case Black recognized that Massachusetts had "some interest" in the insurance policy involved in that litigation: (1) The policy was
executed in Massachusetts; and (2) The insurance company had offices in Massachusetts. "But plainly these interests cannot outweigh the interest of Louisiana in
taking care of those injured in Louisiana." 348 U.S. 66, at 73 (emphasis added).
And in the Pacific Employers case, Justice Stone wrote: "This court must determine
for itself how far the full faith and credit clause compels the qualification or denial
of rights asserted under the laws of one state, that of the forum, by the statute
of another state." 306 U.S. 493, at 502. And then: "Although Massachusetts has
an interest in safeguarding the compensation of Massachusetts employees while
temporarily abroad in the course of their employment, and may adopt that policy
for itself, that could hardly be thought to support an application of the full faith
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While the area affected by the operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
does considerably overlap the area affected by the Due Process Clause of the
14th Amendment when choice-of-law questions arise, the two areas are not
"coterminous." 28 The most recent decision in Clay makes no distinction between
the effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as distinguished from the effect
of the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause as they control that case, if there is
any distinction to be made.
While the Douglas opinion is compatible with the Currie thesis, it affords
no assistance whatsoever for those at the other end of the spectrum who espouse
the cause voiced by the late Justice Jackson in an article titled Full Faith and
Credit-the Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution.29
Jackson viewed the Full Faith and Credit Clause as the means provided by
the constitutional authors for federalizing the separate and independent state legal
systems "by the overriding principle of reciprocal recognition of public acts, records
and judicial proceedings."3 9
Jackson thought that the Court had weighed competing state interests in determining which state's law should be applied in order to satisfy the Full Faith
and Credit Clause when choice-of-law questions arose in the area of workmen's
compensation claims. But he disliked that approach and called it a "tentative and
inadequate" answer to the problem of when the law of the forum state must give
way to the law of anothers1 The Full Faith and Credit Clause, he wrote, requires
recognition by the Supreme Court of a federal interest "which supersedes freedom
of individual state action by a compulsory policy of reciprocal rights to demand
and obligations to render faith and credit '3 2
According to Jackson, the interest of the federal system in a settled answer
to the question of when the policies of one state must yield to another -has iot
been argued with much strength, primarily because the federal government is not
often involved in litigation which turns on the Full Faith and Credit Clause:
In contrast, the federalism of the faith and credit clause depends
generally on private advocacy, not always supported by the best research
and understanding, and often finds the perception of the Justices unsharpened by any extensive experience or investigation of the subject.33
The Clay case might -be an ideal one to raise the question: What conceivable
interest would the federal union have in requiring Florida to put aside its policy
protecting persons from stipulations which limit their rights of action to less than
the statutory period of limitations in deference to the Illinois policy favoring insurance companies, when a Florida citizen is suing in a Florida court to recover
and credit clause which would override the constitutional authority 6f another
state to legislate for the bodily safety and economic protection of employees injured within it." (Emphasis added.) 306 U.S. at 503.
28. Currie, supra note 24, at 15.
29. 45 COL. L. REv. 1 (1945).
30. Id. at 17.
31. Id. at 28.
32. Id. at 30.
33. Id. at 33-34.
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for a loss which occurred in Florida? Whatever questions this case presents for
Jackson's followers, the decision in Clay gives no indication that Jackson's views
are receiving recognition.
Summing up, the Clay decision weakens considerably, but does not overrule,
Delta & Pine as precedent. Its outcome is in harmony with the Currie thesis, but
nowhere in the Douglas opinion is there a definite expression of that thesis as
the rationale of the decision.
The decision does nothing to mark the boundaries of the area affected by the
operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause from that area on which the 14th
Amendment Due Process Clause operates in the realm of choice-of-law questions.
Finally, the decision will be of no comfort to those who follow Jackson's quest for
an announcement by the Supreme Court of a new interpretation of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause based on a recognition of a superior "federal interest" to replace
the weighing process which some commentators believe is the Court's method for
resolving choice-of-law questions to meet the constitutional requirements of the
Full Faith and Credit and 14th Amendment Due Process Clauses.
ALLEN

F.

BRAUNINGER

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN-NO CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT
James

v. Hutton'

Minor plaintiffs by their mother and next friend sought a declaratory judgment that they were defendant's illegitimate children and asked for support money.
Defendant's motion to dismiss was sustained, and on appeal the Kansas City
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that no civil remedy exists against the father
of an illegitimate child for its support, and none is to be inferred from the criminal
2
non-support statute.
While neither the mother nor the father owed the illegitimate child any duty
of support under English common law,8 several American states, 4 including Missouri, 5 have placed a non-statutory duty of support upon the mother." The com1. 373 S.W.2d 167 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
2. § 559.350, RSMo 1959: "[I]f any man or woman shall ....
wihout good
cause fail, neglect or refuse to provide adequate food, clothing, lodging, medical
or surgical attention for his or her child or children born in or out of wedlock,
under the age of sixteen years,

. . .

whether or not . .. such child or children, by

reason of such failure, neglect or refusal, shall actually suffer physical or material
want or destitution; . . . then such person shall be deemed guilty of a misde-

meanor; and it shall be no defense to such charge that the father does not have
the care and custody of the child or children. .. ."
3. State ex rel. Canfield v. Porterfield, 222 Mo. 553, 292 S.W. 85 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1927); accord, Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923); Brown
v. Brown, 183 Va. 353, 32 S.E.2d 79 (1944); State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 73
Pac. 375 (1903).
4. 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 18 n.56 (1938, Supp. 1964).
5. State ex rel. Canfield v. Porterfield, supra note 3.
6. That this duty is related to custody of the child, see State v. White, 248
S.W.2d 841 (Mo. 1952); Ramsay v. Thompson, 71 Md. 315, 18 Atl. 592 (1889);
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mon law rule remains in effect as to the father, except in Kansas where it was
held "unadapted to the conditions and unsuitable to the needs of the people .... 7
There the father as well as the mother owes a duty independent of statute, Else9
where, whatever duty a father owes is imposed by statute.
Every state but Idaho, Missouri, and Texas has statutes under which the
father can be compelled to contribute directly to his illegitimate child's support.
Forty-one states have some form of bastardy proceeding1o Five states without
bastardy proceedings do have some type of non-support legislation.- Louisiana
awards illegitimate children "alimony."12

Every attempt to enact comparable legislation in Missouri has been unsucIll. Cent. R.R. v. Sanders, 104 Miss. 257, 61 So. 309 (1913); Jaffe v. Deckhard,
261 S.W. 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). That it is not, see Barrett v. Barrett, 44
Ariz. 509, 39 P.2d 621 (1934); Doughty v. Engler, supra note 3; Gibson v. Gibson,
18 Wash. 489, 51 Pac. 1041 (1898).
7. Doughty v. Engler, supra note 3 at 587, 211 Pac. at 621.
8. The rule statde in Doughty has been followed in Addington v. Addington,
192 Kan. 118, 386 P.2d 219 (1963); Grayson v. Grayson, 182 Kan. 285, 320 P.2d
803 (1958); Wahl v. Walsh, 180 Kan. 313, 304 P.2d 525 (1956); Myers v. Anderson, 145 Kan. 775, 67 P.2d 542 (1937); Miller v. Miller, 116 Kan. 726, 229 Pac.
363 (1924).
9. State ex rel. Canfield v. Porterfield, supra, note 3; accord, Albanese v.

Richter, 67 F. Supp. 771 (S.D. N.J. 1946); Simmons v. Bull, 21 Ala. 501 (1852);
Myers v. Harrington, 70 Cal. App. 680, 234 Pac. 412 (1925); Commonwealth
v. Dornes, 239 Mass. 592, 132 N.E. 363 (1921); Allen v. Hunnicutt, 230 N.C. 49,
52 S.E.2d 18 (1949); Beaver v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 179, 256 S.W. 929 (1923);

Brown v. Brown, supra note 3, see Annot., 30 A.L.R. 1069 (1924).
10. ALA. CODE tit. 27, §§ 12(l)-(10) (Supp. 1960); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-841 to -851 (1956); AmK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-701 to -714 (1962); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 22-6-1 to -6 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-435 to -445
(1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1321-1335 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.011.10 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74.301-.307 (1933); HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 332-1
to -10 (1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106Y4, §§ 1-66 (Smith-Hurd 1963); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 3-623 to -657 (1946); IOWA CODE §§ 675.1-.36 (1962); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 62-2301 to -2321 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 406.010-.160 (1962); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 166, §§ 23-24 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE ch. 16, §§ 66A-P (Supp.

1964); Micir.

STAT. ANN.

§ 25.491-.510 (1957);

MINN. STAT.

§§ 257.18-.33 (1957);

MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 383-01 to -27 (Supp. 1962); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 949901 to -9908 (1947); NE. REV. STAT. §§ 13-101 to -116 (1962); NEv. REV. STAT.
§§ 126.010-.380 (1957); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 168.1-.12 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN.

§§ 9:17-1 to -37 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4-1 to -27 (1953); N.Y. JUDICIARY
LAW §§ 511-563; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-1 to -9 (1950); N.D. REV. CODE
§§ 32-36-01 to -35 (1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.01-24 (Baldwin 1958);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, H§ 71-81 (1941); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 109.110-.230 (1963);
R.I GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-1 to -21 (1956); S.C. CODE §§ 20-305, -309 (1962);
S.D. CODE § 37.2101-.2137 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-222 to -236
(Supp. 1964; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-60-1 to -16 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 331-345 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE H§ 26.24.010-.200 (1958); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 4770-4776(1) (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. H§ 52.21-.45 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14-59 to -96 (1957). See generally 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws § 250
(1936).
11. ALASKA COMp. LAWS ANN. H§ 6508-1 to -7 (1949); CAL. CIV. CODE §
196a; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 273 H§ 11-19 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4732
(1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61.1 (1960). See also Annot., 30 A.L.R. 1075 (1924).
See generally 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 234 (1936).
12. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 245 (West 1952).
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cessful. A bill patterned after the Uniform Illegitimacy Actis was introduced in
the Missouri House of Representatives in 194714 and again in 1951;"5 it was not
enacted either time. In 1959 a bill that would have allowed a civil action to
enforce support of illegitimate children was defeated.1 6 A non-support bill applicable to illegitimate children also was defeated. It would have allowed the judge
to compel support by discretionary use of court order, probation, suspended sentence, bond, or forced labor with wages payable to the neglected wife or child. 7
Existing Missouri statutes are of no direct benefit to the neglected illegitimate
child. In State ex rel. Canfield v. Porterfield,18 the court construed what is now
Section 211.241, RSMo 1959,19 authorizing the juvenile court to order a parent
to support his neglected child, as including only legitimate children. Section
559.350, involved in the principal case, James, is the only other statute in point.
It specifically includes illegitimate children, but, being criminal, punishes violations
by fine or imprisonment-neither of which directly benefits the child.
The James case was not the first attempt to use the criminal non-support
statute as a springboard to civil recovery. The St. Louis Court of Appeals bad
the same question before it in Nelson v. Thompson,20 where plaintiff contended
the facts showed defendant guilty of not supporting his illegitimate child under
section 559.350 and that this statute gave rise to a civil non-support action. The
court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim, because the facts did not
show a violation of the statute,2 1 commenting that whether a violation would give
rise to a civil action "should be reserved for ruling when properly and n~cessarily
'
involved in a case."22
It was so involved in the James case. In ruling no civil liability springs from
this statute, the court relied on Christy v. Petrus23 and legislative history.
The argument made in Christy v. Petrus was that violation of the wrongful
discharge section of the Missouri Workman's Compensation Law 24 also gave the
employee a civil action. The court noted the general rule that criminal statutes
13. UNIFORM ILLEGITMACy Acr (1922). The act was withdrawn by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1943 for revision and re-examination.
14. H.B. 119, 64th Gen. Ass. (1947).
15. H.B. 247, 66th Gen. Ass. (1951).
16. H.B. 543, 70th Gen. Ass. (1959).
17. H.B. 544, 70th Gen. Ass. (1959).
18. Supra note 3. See Annot., 30 A.L.R. 1075 (1924).
19. Formerly § 2611, RSMo 1919.
20. 253 S.W.2d 516 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952).
21. When the petition was filed the court had held in State v. Williams,
224 S.W.2d 844 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949) that the father's custody of the child
was not necessary for conviction, contrary to what was said in State v. Barcikowsky, 143 S.W.2d 341 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940). While Nelson was being litigated,
the Williams case was overruled by State v. White, 243 S.W.2d 818 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1951), transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court in 363 Mo. 83, 248 S.W.2d
841 (1952). After Nelson, the legislature amended the statute, making lack of
custody no defense: Mo. Laws 1953, at 424, § 559.350.
22. Supra note 20, at 519.
23. 365 Mo. 1187, 295- S.W.2d 122 (En Banc 1956).
24. § 287.780, RSMo 1959.
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will not be construed as creating new civil actions independent of the common
law unless legislative intent to create such an action is clear.25 It then looked for
that intent. Citing several Missouri statutes that expressly provide for recovery
of damages and penalties by injured persons, often in addition to criminal penalties, 28 the court reasoned that this is how the legislature declares its intent to
create new actions.
After finding no civil remedy was expressly created by the criminal nonsupport statute, the court hearing the James case inquired into legislative history
for further help. The attitude of Missouri's lawmakers was reflected in their consistent refusal to authorize such a proceeding or cause of action. Without either
express or implied intent on the part of the legislature to provide a civil action,
the court could only refuse to create one on its own.
With Missouri's courts committed to giving effect to the common law rule
and to excluding illegitimate children from protection under the civil non-support
statute, the result of the James decision is to eliminate any possibility of judicial
relief independent of the legislature. Any change in Missouri law must be the
product of legislative action; it is hoped that action will come.
The most progressive legislation the General Assembly could enact would
be a statute similar to Arizona's law that declares every child, however born, the
legitimate child of his natural parents.2 7 More likely to pass are statutes that
would align Missouri with the overwhelming majority of states providing a proceeding whereby the neglected illegitimate child's father, who owes the moral duty
of support, can be compelled to contribute directly to the child's support.28 The
passage of the latter type of legislation is here urged. Why the nature of one's
birth should determine his right to be supported by his father defies reason.
RONALD E. SMULL

INSURANCE-AUTOMOBILE COLLISION COVERAGE
-CONSTRUCTION
Payne v. Western Cas. & Sur. Company'

Plaintiff was operating his tractor-trailer on a rain-slick highway. The tractortrailer started onto the soft shoulder to the right of the highway, causing the
wheels suddenly to be partially submerged in the soft soil which materially reduced
and stopped the forward progress of the vehicle. The trailer did not overturn but
the sudden stop and the weight of the load combined to cause the trailer to be
materially damaged. It was agreed that neither the tractor nor the trailer came
in contact with any object other than the soft shoulder of the highway. Plaintiff
25.
26.
27.
28.

Supra note 23, at 1192, 295 S.W.2d at 126.
Id. at 1193-94, 295 S.W.2d at 127.
ARrz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956).
Supra notes 9-11.

1. 379 S.W.2d 209 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964).
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claimed the trailer was damaged in the amount of $1350.00 and sought recovery
under the collision provision of an insurance policy issued by defendant. The applicable section stated:
Coverage E-Collision: To pay for loss caused by collision of the automobile with another object to which it is attached or by upset of the
automobile, but only for the amount of each such loss in excess of the
deductible amount, if any, stated in the declarations as applicable.2
Although defendant argued there was no collision with another object, the Kansas
City Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for plaintiff who recovered for the
damage to his tractor-trailer.
No other common law court has had an opportunity to apply such a liberal
construction to the term "collision with another object." The cases which have
considered the problem of construing collision coverage do not reveal a similar fact
situation.8 Thus, these facts must be considered in light of the general rules of
construction of insurance contracts.
In Varble v. Stanley, Missouri adopted the general rule of adhesion contract
construction:
All provisions of the policy must be given their plain and reasonable
meaning and all parts thereof must, if possible, be harmonized and given
effect in order to accomplish the intention of the parties. But an insurance
policy, being a contract designated to furnish protection, will if reasonably possible, be construed so as to accomplish it. Hence, if the terms are
susceptible of two possible interpretations and there is room for construction, provisions limiting, cutting down or avoiding liability on the
coverage made in the policy are construed most strongly against the
insurer.4
Thus, in a fact situation such as the principal case, coverage will be afforded to
the insured if reasonable construction permits. However, a number of courts hold
the term "collision with an object" is to be given its usual and popular meaning,
not an unusual meaning."
An example of this attitude is found in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cartmele
where the roadbed on a beach suddenly gave way under the car and it went down
in soft sand and stuck. In construing the term "collision with another object"
the court said:
Was the occurrence described in evidence a "collision" according to popular and usual significance of that term, of the automobile of plaintiff
with another object? The automobile as it ran along the beach was in
2. Id. at 210.
3. For general survey of cases see Annot., Automobile Insurance-Collision
Damage, 23 A.L.R.2d 389 (1952), 7 Am. JuR.2d Automobile Insurance § 57 (1963),
45 C.J.S. Insurance § 796 (1946), 6 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW
AND PRACTICE 286 (1945), 5 APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRAcrmcE 340
(1941), Langtry, Automobile Insurance-Collision, 13 OME. L. REV. 61 (1933),
M.F.C., I-nsurance-Automobile-Collision,11 TUL. L. REv. 134 (1937).
4. 306 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Spr. Mo. App. 1957).
5. 7 Am. JUR.2d Automobile Insurance § 58, n. 16 (1963); Annot., 23
A.L.R.2d 389, 396 (1952).
6. 87 Fla. 495, 100 So. 802 (1924); See also Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1013 (1925).
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contact with the "roadbed" which is conceded to be "another object"
within the meaning of that
term as employed in the policy. It did not
7
strike against the roadbed.
The court, employing the usual and popular meaning, held that no collision resulted. The principal case cited a similar Tennessee decision which held since the
automobile was already in contact with the road there could be no collision in the
sense of two separated objects coming together."
These cases demonstrate the tendency of some courts to construe the term
"collision" somewhat narrowly, restricting the interpretation to the popular meaning or at least to the meaning intended by the parties.9
However, the majority of courts construe the word "collision" broadly and
hold that the term means striking together or striking against. This is usually a
result of following a dictionary definition of collision. 10 Missouri has accepted
this view."1
Since there cannot be a collision without the existence of an object, courts
must also define "object" as used in the policy. No disagreement among the cases
is found here. All cases support the rule that the word "object" means anything
tangible and visible and is not confined to objects similar to an automobile. This
definition rejects the rule of ejusdem generis. Missouri is also in agreement with
2
this view.'
By literally applying the definition of "collision" and "object" as accepted
in Missouri, the court in the principal case came to a correct result. There was a
striking against the dirt immediately in front of the wheels and the dirt so struck
is certainly visible and tangible. The problem with this holding is finding a way
to reconcile the results with language found in cases like Varble v. Stanleyla that
words in an insurance policy must carry out the intent of the parties. A case
which gives emphasis to this point is Okio Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sparks,14
where plaintiff alleged a falling telephone pole, caused by a tornado, "collided"
with her automobile and claimed damages under collision coverage of her policy.
The court held there was no coverage since an object that descends upon another
is not described as "colliding" but "falling." It was further stated:
While the word "collision" is defined by lexicographers might be strained
to include any impact of one body with another, the word in an insurance
7. Id. at 500, 100 So. at 804.
8. Great Eastern Cas. Co. v. Solinsky, 150 Tenn. 206, 263 S.W. 71 (1924);
See also Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1013 (1925).
9. For collection of cases supporting this view see Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d
389, 399 (1952).
10. For collection of cases supporting this view see Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d
389, 397 (1952).
11. Boecker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 281 S.W.2d 561 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955).
12. Rouse v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 203 Mo. App. 603, 219 S.W.
688 (St. L. Mo. App. 1920).
13. Supra note 2.
14. 57 Ga. App. 830, 833, 196 S.E. 915, 917 (1938). Accord: Price, InsuranceConstruction of Collision Coverage, 7 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 89 (1955); but see Burton,
Insurance Collision Coverage as to Falling Objects, 8 ALA. L. REv. 406 (1956).
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policy must be construed in accordance with what the parties to the contract must reasonably be said to have contemplated as to the coverage. 15
Concededly, the court was influenced by insured's failure to purchase comprehensive coverage to protect against loss caused by tornado in addition to the
collision coverage. This would imply that no loss caused by a tornado would be
covered under the collision section of the policy. But, the case illustrates that
where the injury alleged by the insured is not due to a risk contemplated by
the parties at the time of contracting, no coverage is extended if such injury
occurrs.
By way of analogy to the principal case, it can be said the parties contracted
under the assumption that coverage would be extended to all accidents which give
rise to damage to the insured vehicle caused by a collision. Such accidents as striking another vehicle, embankments, telephone poles, ditches, ledges, or any vertical
object would certainly be intended by the parties to be within the collision coverage. It can hardly be said that the parties, at the time of contracting, understood that coverage would be afforded if the vehicle ran onto the shoulder of the
road and was abruptly stopped by soft soil. Such an accident would not be
viewed by the ordinary person as a "collision with another object." Probably the
truck driver did not think he was involved in a collision nor would a passing
motorist have believed a collision had just occurred.
However, it is doubtful if a court would allow the intent of the parties
to override the words of the policy when the words are given a literal interpretation such as the Missouri courts have done in defining "collision" and "object."
Although this holding seems novel, when the court accepted definition of
"collision with another object" is applied to the facts of this case, it appears to
be decided on solid grounds. If any insurer is alarmed at this construction then
heed must be taken to the warning given by the court, "If the insurer had desired to absolve itself from collisions of this character it should have tendered a
policy containing appropriate restrictive or limiting clauses."16
KERRY MoNTGOMERY

SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY LAW RELEASE
Eberting v. Skinner'
A car driven by Eberting, an uninsured motorist, collided with a car driven
by Mrs. Skinner. To avoid losing his driver's license, he obtained releases from
both Mrs. Skinner and her husband. 2 Later, Eberting sued Mrs. Skinner for his
15. Id. at 833, 196 S.E. at 917. Accord: Chandler v. Aetna Ins. Co. 188 So.
506 (La. App. 1939).
16. Payne v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., supra note 1, at 213.
1. 364 S.W.2d 829 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963).
2. Sections 303.030(1), .060, .070(4), RSMo 1959, provide that a Missouri
resident who has had an automobile accident must satisfy the Director of Revenue
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injuries. Mrs. Skinner in a summary judgment motion conterded that Eberting was
estopped from suing her.3 The trial court granted the summary judgment and the
Springfield Court of Appeals affirined.
Eberting had obtained the release forms from the Safety Responsibility Unit
in Jefferson City. They read, in part:
The Undersigned hereby certifies that . . . she . . . has released . . .
[Eberting] from all claims and causes of action of the undersigned arising
from the above described accident, and authorized the Safety Responsibility Unit to accept this certificate as satisfactory evidence of such release
from liability. . .
Eberting testified that he obtained the form for Mrs. Skinner's signature "on
account of my license was about to be revoked because it had not been sent in."
Eberting sent the release form to Mrs. Skinner's insurer which, in turn, obtained
Mrs. Skinner's signature on it. The release was returned to Eberting and he personally took it to the Safety Responsibility Unit in Jefferson City. At this time
the Safety Responsibility Unit told him that Mr. Skinner would also have to
release him. Eberting testified that he obtained an identical release form and
"drove to Mrs. Skinner's home about 11:00 o'clock one night and just
told her the situation, that they both had to send in a release, and I
would like for them to do it. Her husband was out of the state at the
time on a trucking mission, he was a truck driver. I asked her if she
would take the release, have her husband sign it and sent it to Mr. Cass,
the Commissioner, at Jeff City, which she did."'i
The focus of the appellate court's reasoning is in the following paragraph:
[W]e think that the content of the instruments is not the most important
thing. The whole transaction and the circumstances surrounding the affair
must be taken into account. It is not essential that an express written
instrument be used in order to accomplish an accord and satisfaction.
It may be implied from the circumstances indicating the intention of the
parties. . . . But while the matter of accord and satisfaction is ordinarily
a question of intention, where the evidence is such as to admit of only
one conclusion, the trial court is justified in determining it as a matter of
law.... The law will imply the intention from the acts of the parties...
The court next discussed the consideration necessary for an accord and satisfaction, stating that the consideration need not be financial remuneration, but
that he is able to pay any judgment against him resulting from the accident or
suffer suspension of his license and car registration. Alternative ways of satisfying
the director are provided: (1) offering security through carrying insurance or
posting bond, (2) obtaining a release from liability, (3) being finally adjudicated
not liable, or (4) executing a duly acknowledged written agreement providing for
installment paying of an agreed amount for all claims arising from the accident.
In the present case, since Eberting was driving a state-owned car at the time
of the accident, he was threatened only with loss of his driver's license.
3. Although Eberting also released the Skinners, this release was not discussed
by the court. The decision is based wholly on a theory of estoppel.
4. Eberting v. Skinner, supra note 1, at 831.
5. Id. at 832.
6. Id. at 834.
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might consist of "forebearance or some detriment suffered." The court found that
in signing the release Mrs. Skinner gave consideration to Eberting by giving up
her right to sue him. The court then found that Mrs. Skinner got a "benefit" from
Eberting, because:
Had she refused to release him from the obligation (imposed by law)
to deposit security, there could have -been an inducement on the part of
Eberting to bring action against her at once in order to get the question
of liability settled. Presumably it was to her benefit that such action
should not be taken and that the matter be settled. The law favors compromises and settlements.7
The court did not inquire into the actual facts and circumstances to determine
that Mrs. Skinner got consideration from Eberting for her release. Mrs. Skinner
and her husband might have released Eberting out of a sense of moral obligation,
but this possibility was not even considered by the court. It is possible that neither
Mr. nor Mrs. Skinner suffered any injury; that they felt they were adequately
protected from liability to Eberting by their own insurance; and that they gave
the release in the belief that since Eberting owed them nothing there was no good
reason to cause this man either to lose his driver's license or to suffer the inconvenience and expense of posting bond.
The court ignores these possibilities and looks only to the fact that Eberting
obtained releases from the Skinners. The court then concludes:
In situations of this kind the courts have frequently applied the
principles of equitable estoppel. .

.

. In this instance the appellant, for

his own benefit, induced the respondent to change her position to her
detriment. . . . [Hie cannot now take the shield which she has handed
him and use it as a sword against her. 8
Note that Eberting gave the Skinners no money for the release. If he had
given money it might be reasonable to conclude that such conduct would amount
to a statement on Eberting's part that the money represented the difference between his claims against the Skinners and their claims against him (i.e., that this
one transaction cleared all obligations arising out of the accdent). In the instant
case, however, nothing done by Eberting could have induced the Skinners to reasonably believe that all rights and liabilities were settled.
The court, however, seems to say that when Mrs. Skinner signed the release,
this was sufficient for a finding (1) that Mrs. Skinner intended this as a complete
accord and satisfaction between herself and Eberting, and (2) that as a matter
of law Eberting is estopped in equity to deny that such an accord and satisfaction was had. One court has described such an estoppel in these terms:
We consider the better rule to be that the making of the original settlement without any express reservation or rights by the settlor constitutes
7. Id. at 835.
8. Ibid.
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a complete accord and satisfaction of all claims of the immediate parties
to the settlement arising out of the same accident.
Until we know what the parties intended at the time the releases were executed
-at least what the party seeking the relief of estoppel had in mind-the doctrine
of equitable estoppel seems misapplied. Corpus luris states:
Before an estoppel can be raised there must be certainty to every intent
and the facts alleged to constitute it are not to be taken by argument or
inference. Nothing can be supplied by intendment. No one should be
denied the right to set up the truth, unless it is in plain contradiction of
his former allegations or acts. If an act or admission is susceptible of two
constructions, one of which is consistent with a right asserted by the
party sought to be estopped, it forms no estoppel.1°
The Safety Responsibility Act was not intended to bar recovery by every
motorist who obtains a release to save his license. As the title of the Act indicates, the legislature intended to insure financial responsibility. Had the legislature
wanted to penalize uninsured drivers by not allowing them to recover, it could
have said so. Nothing in the statutes or the release could have warned Eberting,
a layman, of the result reached in this case. The doctrine of estoppel was created
to prevent injustice. "[Elstoppels are odious and will not be lightly invoked. . .
In applying estoppel so mechanically, the court has created an injustice.
After this decision, a motorist who is clearly liable for an accident might
well be advised by his attorney or insurance company to give the other party
a release from liability, and thus escape liability. As a matter of law, the court
now construes a release as a complete accord and satisfaction. It is hoped that this
appellate court or the Missouri Supreme Court will, at the first opportunity, over12
rule or reverse such a construction.
RAY L. CASKEY

9. Win. H. Heinemann Creameries, Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 270
Wis. 443, 452b, 72 N.W.2d 102, 103 (1955) (on motion for rehearing). Estoppel
as a result of release has also been considered in England v. Yellow Transit Co.,
240 Mo. App. 968, 225 S.W.2d 366 (Spr. Ct. App. 1949).
10. 21 C.J. Estoppel § 139 at 1139 (1920); cf. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 162 (1964)
indicating that a few cases have allowed various elements of an estoppel to be
shown by circumstantial evidence or by inference from facts found to have been
established. In Drake v. Egglestion, 123 Ind. App. 306, 314, 108 N.E.2d 901, 902
(1952), the court says in denying the motion for rehearing, "If a case for equitable
estoppel is rounded out by an inescapable or compelling inference arising from

establishedfacts, it seems to us that such inference has all the dignity and probative value of direct and positive testimony, and there is no reason or logic, for its
exclusion from consideration." (Emphasis added.)
11. S. S. Allen Grocery Co. v. Bank of Buchanan County, 192 Mo. App. 476,
482, 182 S.W. 777, 779 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916).
12. In Farmer v. Arnold, 371 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1963), a case involving money
consideration for a release, the Missouri Supreme Court said: "And in its essentials,
including many of the circumstances, the recent case of Eberting v. Skinner ...
is the key to this cause and in its essence governs its determination." This use
of the instant case as precedent does not indicate an immediate overruling.
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